Target:
E-8 (See Target
Command
and Control: MACV-SOG, 5th SFGA.
Area
of Operation: Laos.
Mission:
Primary--Capture NVA Soldier.
Secondary--Wiretap NVA
communications lines.
Alternate--Look for
American POW.
Target
Team: Spike (ST) Idaho.
Date:
8 November 1968.
Launch
Site: Phu Bai, FOB #1.
Insertion
Aircraft: Kingbee, Vietnamese-piloted H-34 helicopters.
Lead
Ship: 1-0 U.S. team leader: John “Tilt” S. Meyers.
1-1
U.S. assistant leader,
John E. Shore; 01-VN team leader, Sau;
and 02-team
interpreter, Hiep
.
Second
Ship: 12-third American, Henry H. King, III; 03-pointman, Son; 08-tailgunner,
Cau; and 09--M79
man, Tuan.
Third
Ship: Backup.
Assets
on Site: 2 A1E Skyraiders, 1 0-2 Covey, 2 UH-1B Huey gunships, and F-4
Phantoms on call.
Operation
Command Center: MACVSOG, Phu Bai, FOB #1.
Our
patrol order was simple and straightforward, but it was a long way from the
whole story. By early November
1968, Spike teams in Forward Operating Base (FOB) #1 had taken a beating.
Teams from MACV-SOG running missions into Laos found it harder to
penetrate the Prairie Fire area of operation (AO).
Enemy
trackers were getting better and Charlie kept installing more 37mm
antiaircraft guns, which were extremely effective against choppers.
In addition, the NVA began putting spotters on LZ.
Because the number of good LZ was limited, they’d booby-trap some of
them. Intelligence reports had
warned all teams about the deadly helicopter booby traps regular Army troops
had encountered on LZ in Vietnam. These
booby traps, initiated by thing trip wires, triggered firing devices that
included every thing from hand grenades to 250-pound bombs hidden on the LZ.
Nonetheless, the brass in Saigon and the S-3 (operations) boys at FOB
#1 never relented in trying to get a team on the ground in the Prairie Fire
AO. The reasons were simple:
Intelligence reports said the NVA had more than 40,000 people maintaining the
Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in Laos and Uncle Ho’s troops were sending an
every increasing number of troops, along with supplies and weapons, down the
network of hidden trails.
Because
of the endless escalation of NVA activity in Laos, Saigon had an equally
endless appetite to get as much intelligence from the AO as possible.
For several days before ST Idaho drew the Echo 8 target, our team had
set a record of sorts by getting shot out of more LZ than any team in Phu Bai
.
Setting
that record--no one actually counted the number--was a draining, often deadly
exercise which would run like this: As the team leader, I’d get a target in
the morning, the covey (0-1 observation aircraft pilot), if he had time, would
pick primary, secondary and alternate LZ.
We’d load up on the Kingbees (H-34 helicopters), go into the primary
LZ and get shot out, then get shot out of the secondary and alternate sites.
Because the flights to the Prairie Fire AO were so long, we’d have to
fly back to Phu Bai, refuel, eat lunch, get another target and try it
again-with identical results in the afternoon.
After
four days of being run out of LZ, ST Idaho was beat.
The fatigue of being airborne for so long and then flying into an LZ
and either getting shot out of it or spotting enemy personnel, which
compromised the mission, was exhausting.
On
the fourth day, we got blown out of the three LZ in the morning.
While the team ate lunch, the S-3 told me the afternoon target would be
Echo 8. Shortly after receiving
the assignment, I found the man flying covey for us, SFC Robert J.
“Spider” Parks, and told him the news.
At
the time, Spider was joking with a couple of guys in the club.
When I said Echo 8, the smile drained from his face and he warned:
“Don’t forget what happened to Lane.
Be extra careful out there. Charlie
has his fucking act together there, and we still don’t know what happened to
Lane.
Lane
was Sergeant First Class Glenn Lane. In
May 68, Lane was the leader of ST Idaho when it was inserted into Whiskey 2, a
target a few klicks away from Echo 8. After
Lane’s team was inserted, the radioman gave a team OK.
That was the last anyone ever heard from them.
For two or three days, numerous coveys tired to raise Lane or anyone
from his team. The way it looked,
ST Idaho simply disappeared.
When
ST Oregon ran a “Brightlight” mission (a heavily armed recon team that
carried no food and little water as it searched for a missing team or team
members), the team couldn’t get off the LZ.
They were hit hard by NVA troops firing American weapons and using
American hand grenades instead of the less reliable Chicom grenades.
Every team member of ST Oregon was wounded.
No
one ever heard from Lane or his ST Idaho again*.
Two weeks after Lane disappeared, Spider was appointed 10 for Idaho and
I became the 12--radio operator. By
November, Spider was flying covey and I was the 1-0, an E-3 filling an E-8/E-9
slot, which was not uncommon in 1968.
With
Spider’s warning ringing in my ears, I briefed the team.
Sau’s eyes lit up when I showed him the map and our latest target.
“Number fucking 10 target!” he exclaimed.
He had been present at Lane’s final briefing, but didn’t run that
fatal mission. After we ate
lunch, we boarded the Kingbees and headed west again.
Lane and the other missing members of ST Idaho, who remain missing
today, haunted us.
En
route to the target, Spider radioed me that he had found a good LZ on the side
of a mountain. Even as the 10, I
carried the radio on ST Idaho. There
were too many cases of young radioman accidentally misdirecting air strikes
onto their teams.
I
sat in the door when we neared the target area and Shore crouched behind me.
When the Kingbee pilot spotted the LZ, the old H-34 suddenly went into
a dying, diving swan act as he spiraled downward several thousand feet toward
the LZ.
About
100 feet from the ground, the pilot revved the engine, ending the dead swan
spiral, and flared out for a landing. As
we descended, I searched the LZ for booby traps and shore scanned the wood line.
For the first time in four days, there was no greeting party or booby
traps.
The
insertion was slick. From the LZ,
we found a narrow pass into the jungle which led to an enormous wooded area
that looked more like the White Mountains of New Hampshire than a Southeast
Asia jungle.
Because
the wooded area was so open, I put the team on line and Sau reminded everyone
to cover their own tracks as we advanced north up the mountain.
Instead of moving cautiously as we normally did in dense jungle, I had
the team march as quickly as possible. As
we moved up the mountain, I radioed Spider with a “team OK.”
Usually,
after receiving a team OK, Spider would silently fly out of the target area.
On that day, he warned: “Be careful...I’m going to fly over another
team [which had launched from Mai Loc] and I’ll be back in an hour.
I’ll stay over target until I hear a click team OK from you.”
A
click team OK was merely breaking squelch twice quickly on the PRC-25 handset.
Without speaking, we minimized the NVA’s radio direction finding
(RDF) capabilities.
I
wanted to get as far away from the LZ as quickly as possible.
For more than an hour we pushed up the hill, moving on line for at
least 30 minutes before returning to more traditional in-line march.
Because we moved without taking a break, climbing straight up, the team
was sucking gas. We were still a
long way from the top of the mountain, which was where I hoped to establish
our rest [remain] over night (RON) site.
After
about 75 minutes on the ground, Son, who was running point, and Sau, who was
behind him, signaled “trail ahead.” Son
and Sau moved forward for point reconnaissance while the rest of us caught our
breath.
Sau
returned in a few minutes. He
said there was good news and bad news. The
good news was there were NVA walking casually along the east-west trail.
Some of them had AK-47s on their shoulders without magazines in them.
Speaking through Hiep, our interpreter, Sau said, “I don’t think
they know we’re here.”
The
bad news was the trail was wide, as wide as two lanes on an interstate.
On
the north side of the trail were telephone lines.
I told Sau I wanted to get across ASAP. Shore moved east and I moved
west along the trail to provide security while the team crossed.
We
crossed without incident and I moved the team about 100 yards north of the
trail. Sau climbed one of the
telephone poles and started a wiretap on the phone lines.
Meanwhile, Shore, Son and Tuan moved down the mountain and put in our
ambush explosives.
Again,
the wooded area worked to our advantage; it wasn’t the thick sort of jungle
where you couldn’t see 10 feet in front of you.
Team members could move quickly, yet had enough cover to avoid being
seen from the road.
The
ambush munitions consisted of two claymore mines facing the trail, with the
inner killing arcs crossing in the center of the ambush.
Hours of practice installing and ambush paid off here.
They knew exactly how far apart the claymores had to be At the center
of the claymores’ killing zone, between the arcs of pellets they’d throw
out, there was a zone big enough for one person to survive.
And exactly six feet from the trail, at that precise location, was a
piece of C-4 plastic explosive which was powerful enough to knock unconscious
the one person who survived the deadly claymore killing zone.
We
knew the C-4 was the right amount because one of our fellow Green Berets
practiced igniting different quantities of C-4 until he knocked himself out on
our firing range at Phu Bai.
Then
Son and Tuan placed flank security claymores at the eastern and western ends
of the ambush zones for team security, and Cau put a claymore north of our
team for rear security.
Textbook
perfect. With the ambush set up,
Shore and I started joking about where we’d spend our bonus and extra
R&R. MACV-SOG had promised
that all team members who captured a live NVA soldier would get a cash bonus
and a five-day R&R anywhere in the world.
We
had good reason to dream. Sau and
Hiep, who spoke French, English, Vietnamese and understood some Laotian, were
monitoring the wiretap. As we sat
on the north side of the trail, we observed several more NVA soldiers,
including an officer, walking casually without realizing we were contemplating
snatching their bodies for a quick trip to Saigon.
When
Spider returned, I could barely control my enthusiasm.
I told him to scramble the Kingbees and give me a precise time on
target (TOT) at our primary LZ because we’d have one live NVA package.
Because it was an open air transmission, the NVA POW portion of the
message was in code, just in case Charlie was monitoring our frequencies.
Then
things turned to shit.
“Don’t
move!” Spider cautioned. “Don’t move! Don’t breath! Don’t fart!
Don’t do nothing,” he said in an unusually nervous voice.
Before
I could ask why, he continued, “I’m at 10,000 feet and I can’t see you.
You’re simply socked in. Right
now we couldn’t find a mountain down there, let alone a spike team.
Cool it. Don’t do
anything. And above all, don’t
make contact until this weather breaks.”
Then
I remembered seeing a bank of clouds to the west as we inserted.
As I looked up, the jungle/forest we were in was over 200 feet tall and
blocked our direct sunlight so we couldn’t tell what the sky looked like.
We
hard tanks moving north of our position and dogs from the direction of our LZ.
All of a sudden, people on the trail started running.
No more casual Sunday walks without weapons.
A squad of NVA walked past, moving west.
Ten I though about Lane. Spider’s
last warning. “Don’t move.
Don’t do anything,” was ringing in my ears.
Within
minutes, we heard the first shots fired by scouts who were working with the
dogs. It was obvious the damn
dogs were heading north and had found our scent.
I
ordered the ambush disarmed and repacked.
I told Sau to run the wiretap as long as possible.
He had it rigged so he could pull it down with a quick jerk on the
wire.
The
tanks that were north of us sounded like they were heading west, so we moved
east. Before we left, Cau
placed large quantities of ground black pepper in the area where we had set up
our ambush, to foul the noses of the dogs.
We
continued to move east around an enormous mountain as the activity continued
to escalate behind us. At
approximately 1800 hours we encountered a mountain creek that ran south down
the hill, that had lots of water in it and steep embankments on each side.
We
jumped in the creek and moved north, upstream, for 15 minutes without pause.
Because of the heavy cloud cover, darkness was beginning to set in.
Sau, who had been running missions for five years, agreed that it was
best to move as long as we could.
Occasionally
the team would stop and all eight members walked up the embankments and into
the jungle, setting false trails for the dogs to follow.
By
last light the team was exhausted, hungry and wet.
Spider said the weather had worsened.
As
we moved up the east embankment, we could hear dozens of truck south of us,
apparently moving along the trail where we had set up our ambush hours
earlier.
Sau
climbed the biggest tree around to see what was going on.
He said the trucks were bringing hundreds of NVA troops along the road
where we had set up our ambush. And
they were heading north up the mountain with lanterns, looking for us.
We
ate our dehydrated rations in shifts. At
midnight, the NVA and their dogs were still coming up the mountain.
At 0130 hours, Sau said he could see the lanterns approaching our team.
Around
0300 hours, the lanterns got low on fuel and most of the NVA finally turned
around and went back down the mountain, except for two soldiers who had walked
up the creek and past us. After
they walked past us I GAVE Hiep, who had a bad cigarette cough, a bottle of
cough syrup to suppress any coughs because the damp weather, wet ground and
walking in the creek had irritated his throat.
As
the two NVA were returning down the mountain past us, walking in complete
darkness, HIEP coughed. Then one
of the NVA started crawling up the embankment toward me.
I was facing the creek, sitting up.
The
NVA soldier was good. He only
moved when the wind stirred the trees. During
one windy movement, the NVA soldier touched the sole of my jungle boot.
I heard him gasp.
It
was pitch black. I couldn’t see
him. I wondered if he could see
my CAR-15 pointing
at him.
I
didn’t dare shoot. I was
playing the biggest game of hide-and-seek in my life and I didn’t want to
alert this Charlie’s buddies, most of whom were walking down the mountain,
as to where we were.
When
the wind next blew, he crawled back down the embankment.
By 0400 hours, he and his buddy were heading down the stream. At first
light, we moved northeast up the mountain, which seemed like the largest
mountain on earth. We moved all
day, reaching the top near last light. ST
Idaho was beat. The jungle we
moved through was thick but not dense. Climbing
all day had been tough on all of us. The
only contact we had was when Son and Sau did a brief area recon and ran into
some woodcutters-who quickly ran away.
About
midnight, the sky cleared. There
wasn’t a cloud anywhere. We
made radio contact with Batcat, codename for the airborne command ship that
flew over the Prairie Fire AO 24 hours a day.
I told him we were going to say on the mountaintop all day, especially
if the weather got bad. We gave
Spider a team OK and healed our hiking wounds.
That
night, while monitoring different FM frequencies, we picked up a Russian
transmission.
A
few months before this mission, we had heard about the Russians and Chinese
working in “neutral” Laos, but this was the first time we had audio proof.
Ivan was on the air, live at midnight.
I tried to raise Batcat but couldn’t.
With
the long antenna on the PRC-25, I moved to the east side of the mountain and
tried to contact Lemon Tree, a radio site manned by MACV-SOG personnel.
Again, no luck.
While
I was on the radio, Shore came around to my side of the mountain, his eyes
wide open. “You’ve got to see
this to believe it. I think
we’re in the Twilight Zone,” he said.
As
I monitored the Russian conversation, I walked around to the west side of the
mountain. Shore just pointed west
toward another one of the huge Laotian mountains, which was lighting up like a
massive Christmas tree.
It
was after midnight. The Russians
were on our radio. Soon we could
hear Ivan’s plane. Off to the
west, the side of that mountain was lighting up brighter than Broadway in the
Big Apple. Weird!
The
Russians were flying in a resupply to the lighted side of the mountain.
From our distance, the area appeared to be bigger than several football
fields tacked together.
For
several minutes ST Idaho simply stood there in amazement, gazing at the
incredibly brilliant lights made all the brighter by the stark darkness of the
cloudless jungle night.
By
the time I raised someone on the radio, Ivan’s plane had turned around and
headed north.
When
I issued our first verbal report, the radio operator was incredulous: “You
saw what? Where? The pilot was
speaking what language?”
To
complicate matters, in the morning when Spider flew over asking for further
details on our sighting, we learned that our map was missing a couple of
mountains in this particular range, which made it more difficult to report
where we were and where Ivan’s DZ was.
By
0700 we were socked in again. We
hadn’t heard the dogs in over 24 hours, so I sent Sau and Son out to find
the tank trail while Shore and Tuan went out to find some water.
During the night, my tooth had fallen apart, and I was in much pain.
Because King was carrying a slide-action 40mm grenade launcher, I kept
him on the hill with me.
Shore
and Tuan observed some woodcutters hacking away on the large trees, cutting
out one of their slash-and-burn fields that were so plentiful in the
mountainous areas of Laos. They
returned to the hill by noon.
Son
and Sau searched for several hours before spotting some trackers.
Shortly after seeing them, Sau and Son heard the dogs and returned to
the hilltop.
Sau
felt it was only a matter of time before the trackers pinpointed us and so he
urged moving. Ten minutes later
we were heading down the backside of the mountain.
After descending about 1,000 feet, we moved west, back toward the
direction we had come from. During
our travels we crossed several trails that weren’t on the map but were
heavily used.
At
last light, we found a series of huge boulders that were reminiscent of
Stonehenge in Britain. There were
limited entrances into this rocky area and no one could launch a mass assault
against us if they pinpointed us.
About
midnight, ST Idaho was collectively shocked out of its sleep when we heard
barks from what sounded like the largest dogs in the world.
Before
moving out of the RON at first light, Sau reinforced the eastern entrance to
the stone area with mines and pepper.
Spider
was overhead early and I told him we wanted to be extracted ASAP.
After getting a fix on our location-Sau climbed a tree and flashed a
mirror at him--Spider pointed us toward an open area big enough for an
extraction.
He
returned in 30 minutes with bad news: Because the weather had finally broken,
S-3 at Phu Bai ordered him to insert another spike team before they extracted
us.
A
few minutes later, we heard two mines explode at our RON site.
It felt good to hurt Charlie with his own tactics.
By
0900 we had located the LZ and secured it.
As we heard the dogs again, I learned that another spike team had
declared a Prairie Fire emergency after making contact with the NVA.
They had casualties and needed an immediate extraction.
Meanwhile, the other ST was inserted.
I
sent Sau and Son back down our line of march to the LZ and had them set up some
more mines.
By
1100 hours the other team had been extracted and Spider was overhead, taking
ground fire from north of the LZ. When
the first Marine Corps’ UH-1B gunships arrived, I worked them north of our LZ.
They each took several hits. When
the A1E Skyraiders made passes, they also took hits from small arms fire that
sounded like AK-47 rounds. During
the second A1E gun-run, Sau ignited the first claymore in the face of an NVA
scout. Sau blew the second claymore
and returned to the LZ, reporting more NVA troops right behind him.
King
climbed a rock and pumped out six quick rounds of HE toward the area the NVA
were in. Shore and I fired HE
rounds from our sawed-off M-79s. The
40mm barrage slowed the NVA troops long enough for the extraction ships to come
into the LZ.
And
for our first time, slicks from the 101st Airborne Division extracted
us from our target. We were used to
Kingbees and knew most of the pilots on a first-name basis.
The
101st pilots were good, too. They
came right in. Fortunately, Spider
had alerted us about the slicks and I told Shore and King that they had to be
the first people to approach the ship until they had alerted the door gunners to
the fact that five of our men were Vietnamese.
The
extraction was quick. We took several hits on the way out.
As we pulled off the ground, the area north of the LZ lit up with dozens
of flashes from AK-47s and SKS's. As
the gunships laid down final suppression fire during our extraction, the
windshield was blown out of one aircraft and the second chopper took more than a
dozen hits.
When
we got back to FOB #1, a major from S-3 chewed me out for panicking and asking
for an extraction. I explained
about Lane; I told him about the NVA that were closing in on us; the number of
hits the gunships took on the extraction; my broken, painful tooth; the fatigue
of our team; the joy of being socked in for five days; and that we could have at
least one NVA POW had Mother Nature cooperated.
He
didn’t care. He gave me a new
target for the next day.
I
went back to my room and picked up a news magazine with a picture on the front
page about the latest anti-war protester stateside.
Insane.
Whose
side were they on? They didn’t
get to see Charlie like ST Idaho had.
I
went to the dentist, got my tooth pulled, drew new rations and PRC-25 batteries.
The
next day, ST Idaho got shot out of five LZ.
I]. Note:
the following narrative is provided by R.L Noe regarding the lost team:
23 May 68 Glenn Oliver Lane, SFC E-7 Tm Ldr, of Odessa, TX; Robert
Duval Owen, SSGT E-6 Radio Operator of Chatham, Mass; Nine Chinese Nung
members names and ranks unknown of RT Idaho operating in Laos west of A
Loui.. USASF, FOB-I, Phu Bai, Ops 35 are listed as KIA or
captured, MIA Presumptive finding of death and one indigenous
Recovery/Search team member of RT Oregon KIA. On May 20th, a 12 man recon
team was inserted during the morning hours and at 1024 hours made their last
radio contact reporting they could not talk because they had NVA all around
them. On May 22nd, another 12 man recon team was inserted [RT Oregon] and
detected an area about 50 meters away which showed signs of a fire fight
with concussion grenades had exploded. This second team was attacked by a
Company size element and was extracted with one indig killed and 7 members
wounded.)
LANTERNS IN LAOS
The
crachin--a cold, damp fog that covered the Annamite Mountain along the Laos-Vietnam
border--turned our three-day patrol in the hills northwest of Khe Sanh more
miserable than usual in March 1967.
It
had been a fairly typical patrol. There
was little sign of the NVA and there had been no contact.
We’d humped all day through rugged terrain and thick brush with
packs so heavy our shoulders were rubbed raw.
Normally
one didn’t look forward to the sun going down in Vietnam, but under the
circumstances we did. Rest at
last.
That
lasted until somewhere around midnight, when I looked out to the west
through a hole in the fog and saw an entire damn mountain light up.
The whole platoon was up real quick and staring out incredulously at
the sight of what appeared to be hundreds of NVA moving around with lanterns
on a slope way off to the west toward Laos.
Our platoon commander and platoon sergeant got busy under a blanket
with a map and flashlight trying to figure out just which one of the sores
of ridge lines out to the west to try to get some arty called in on, while
the rest of us just watched in utter amazement.
We
couldn’t come up with any reasonable explanation for why the NVA would
light up what had to be a major concentration of their forces.
The arty never arrived--I don’t think I ever learned why— and
after an hour of so the lanterns were extinguished.
We
wrote it off to the “dinks” just trying to mess with our minds and
forgot about it. Over the years
I’ve told the story numerous times when the talk drifted around to the
weird things one saw at night in Vietnam.
Then
reading Issac Staats (John S. Meyers)’ “Shot Out of Laos” some 20
years later I came across the section describing the NVA lighting up
lanterns to search the mountain for the SOG patrol, and I realized what I
had seen that night.
Back
then I knew there were some Army guys doing weird things but never had any
idea there were running around over in Laos.
Now
I now that it was not a little NVA psywar but a desperate game of hide and
seek in the hills. I hope those
SOG guys made it.
--Jim
Graves